After two decades of directing the resistance war against the US and saving the country, in the early spring of 1975, the Supreme Command of the resistance war - including the Politburo, the Central Military Commission... decided to decisively move forward to bring the resistance war against the US and saving the country of the Vietnamese people from complete victory to decisive victory.
In this article, we only present the issue within the specific limits of what scientific basis the Supreme Command met in late 1974 and early 1975 to determine to liberate the South in the shortest time.
These objective bases include subjective and objective factors; from the results of the previous period's guidance and newly emerged factors. These factors can be stated and analyzed as follows:
1. Inheriting the consistency of using revolutionary strength to liberate the South
After several years of restraint and persistent implementation of the policy of peaceful reunification of the country but being rejected by the enemy, in 1959, the Supreme Command of the Vietnamese revolution advocated liberating the South by revolutionary violence. Since then, through periods of arduous and fierce struggle against the three types of fierce wars of the United States, the Vietnamese people persistently and resolutely used violence to defeat the special war, the local war and by 1972, they had fundamentally defeated the Vietnamization of the US war in the South. With the victory on the Southern front in 1972 along withDien Bien Phu in the airforced the opponent to sign the Paris Agreement on Vietnam (1973).
With the signing of the Paris Agreement, the United States was forced to withdraw its troops from the South, pledging to end its military involvement in Vietnam. This event opened the period of the Southern revolution to "fight to overthrow the puppet regime". However, a problem arose: the Agreement stipulated thatrestore peace and end war,recognizing the existence of 2 governments, 2 controlled areas..., then overthrowing the Saigon regime - the force that never implemented the Agreement should force the revolutionary side tobeyond the Agreement, how will it happen? This is one of the big questions for the whole Party, the whole people, and the whole army at that time.
The Resolution of the 21st Central Party Conference (October 1973) resolved this issue, with the following general content:
- With the attack and victory of the army and people of the North and South, forcing the enemy to sign the Paris Agreement, it was a decisive victory for the Vietnamese people in the cause of fighting against the US and saving the country. The Agreement stipulated that the Vietnamese people would have free elections to unify the country. However, because of their nature, the enemy still plotted to permanently divide our country.[1]and the other side has been violating the Agreement very seriously.[2].
- The reality of the situation in the South at that time was developing according to two possibilities. One was that the Vietnamese people gradually forced the enemy to implement the Agreement, peace was truly restored and the people of the South overcame complex difficulties to achieve independence and democracy. The second possibility was that the enemy sabotaged the Agreement, so "We must again wage a fierce and resolute revolutionary war to defeat the enemy and gain complete victory."[3](Resolution emphasizes).
- Considering the situations that may arise, the 21st Conference affirmed that the key issue to complete the struggle for national reunification is "In any situation, must master the armed forces" [4].
On the southern battlefield at that time, after the Agreement was signed, some localities, because they did not fully understand the enemy's plot, were encroached upon by the enemy, losing land and people. Meanwhile, in Zone 9, although the force had not been reinforced as much as in other areas, they had proactively attacked the enemy's encroachment, so the liberated areas were consolidated and expanded.
From the above context, the Party Central Committee directed the revolutionary forces in the South "We must resolutely counterattack and attack the enemy, maintain and promote our initiative in all aspects.”[5].
In short, the most basic spirit of the 21st Conference of the Party Central Committee that was thoroughly communicated to the entire Party, the entire army, and the entire people was to prepare and be ready to use revolutionary violence, maintain the strategic offensive position of the Southern revolution, and be ready to go beyond the Agreement if the opponent refused to implement the signed terms.
From October 1973 onwards, this consistent ideology was thoroughly instilled in all revolutionary forces and from there created a synchronous situation in both strategic offensive and ideology to bring the resistance war against the US to save the country to its final destination. The phenomenon of some localities losing land and people because they did not resolutely deal with the encroaching Saigon army after January 1973 was quickly overcome. Imbued with the spirit of Resolution 21, from the beginning of 1974 onwards, the Liberation Army not only maintained its own areas but also attacked directly into the centers where Saigon sent its encroaching troops.
The idea of using revolutionary violence to liberate the South was the premise for the Supreme General Staff to continue and highly promote in the expanded Politburo Conference held in December 1974/January 1975.
2. The opponent's intentions and capabilities
A core issue in the guiding ideology of the Southern revolution after the Paris Agreement was how the enemy would react when the Southern revolution had no other way but tobeyond the Agreementto complete the task of completely liberating the South and reunifying the country. The essence of this problem is how the United States will react when we move forward to completely liberate the South. In fact, the United States is ready to erase all commitments when necessary. In fact, during the Vietnam War, the United States acted like that. In 1968, the United States committed to ending the bombing of the North, but then in 1972, it attacked the North more brutally... Therefore, how will the United States react if the Southern revolution moves forward to overthrow the Saigon government and completely liberate the South? This is a vital problem that the Central Committee considered and weighed throughout the years 1973-1974 and early 1975.
Also during the above historical period, many countries were also concerned about the real attitude of the United States, which wasstay or gofrom the South, from Southeast Asia to calculate its strategy. The Saigon government is also looking for an answer to this problem, but their intention comes from another aspect. Therefore, both Hanoi and Saigon are trying to probe the attitude of the United States.
The first event that marked the US reaction to the situation in the South was the Tong Le Chan incident. This was a base of the Saigon army, located in Minh Tam commune, Binh Long district, Binh Phuoc. Tong Le Chan was a forward base stationed by a Saigon commando battalion. However, because this base was located deep in the liberated zone and was completely isolated, Saigon's reinforcements for the troops stationed there were very difficult, and had to use helicopters.
Being tightly surrounded by the Liberation Army, in a dilemma, holding this position proved to be more harmful than beneficial, so Saigon calculated to withdraw troops from Tong Le Chan and Saigon really wanted this position to be captured by the Liberation Army (which they calledflooded) to denounce to the international community. But the Liberation forces understood the dilemma of the Saigon army here, so they only surrounded and were ready to destroy the enemy reinforcements from the air. Finally, on April 11, 1974, the Saigon army in Tong Le Chan secretly withdrew from the base and then spoke up to blame the Liberation Army for attacking their outpost.
President Nguyen Van Thieu ordered the radio system to "denounce" the Viet Cong.floodedTong Le Chan and praised that in Tong Le Chan “every soldier (Saigon army) is a hero!” and hoped that the United States would pay attention to this event, even though it was staged by Saigon. But the United States ignored all information about the Tong Le Chan incident from Saigon.[6].
Also during this time, in Washington, the struggle between the legislative and executive branches over US military activities abroad - of which Vietnam was the key - was becoming increasingly fierce.
On November 7, 1973, the War Powers Act was passed.Law of War) was passed by the US Congress. Although there is still debate about the feasibility of the War Powers Act, this law has limited the abuse of the US President's power to use military forces to fight abroad. In particular, the time of birth and the content of this Act affected the military activities of the US army in Vietnam when the US had committed to ending military involvement in the South. Therefore, from the end of 1973 onwards, the US President no longer had the power to use almost unlimited military force in the Vietnam and Indochina battlefields as he had since the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution - a petition passed by the US Congress in August 1964.[7].
Another event that had a profound impact on the situation in Saigon and the United States at that time was the Watergate affair - a humiliation of American democracy at that time, as the American public commented.
Before the Watergate affair was exposed, President Nixon and Kissinger had the intention of finding an excuse to bomb North Vietnam again. They calculated that the Paris Agreement was only a favorable document for the United States because according to the Agreement, the North would return the number of American pilots captured when their planes were shot down during the two wars of sabotage against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Discussing this intention of the United States, in the famous book "No peace, no honor"In his opinion, Larry Berman, a famous scholar in the United States about the Vietnam War, who was a political consultant for President Johnson, commented that "The treaty became a ritual for the United States to withdraw troops and return prisoners of war, not for a lasting peace."[8].
Historical documents declassified in the United States in recent times show that both Nixon and Kissinger wanted to continue the campaign of bombing the North. Nixon wanted to bomb after the North returned the last group of pilots (March 29, 1973) and could bomb until 1976 - the time when Nixon's second presidential term ended. Kissinger wanted to carry out the Duck Stone campaign (bombing the North to exhaustion) after he received the Nobel Peace Prize for his contribution to bringing peace to Vietnam through the Paris Agreement!
Of the five US presidents involved in the Vietnam War, President Nixon was the most aggressive and insidious. But the Watergate incident prevented him from carrying out his plan. Kissinger made a very accurate comment about President Nixon's attitude towards the Vietnam issue: he dealt with it in a strangely incoherent way: He gave up. He did not do a job with the focus and energy that was characteristic of him.[9].
The Watergate affair eventually sank President Nixon.August 9year1974, President Nixon announced his resignation.
Nixon's forced resignation was a warning sign for the Saigon regime. This was something that President Nguyen Van Thieu had to admit in his resignation speech on April 21, 1975. On the contrary, for the cause of liberating the South, this event further marked the possibility that, whether the United States wanted it or not, it was difficult for the United States to return to the South when the Vietnamese people rose up to completely liberate their country.
Four months after Nixon resigned, the Liberation Army of South Vietnam launched the Route 14-Phuoc Long campaign. Within three weeks of late 1974 and early 1975, the Liberation Army attacked and completely liberated Phuoc Long province. This was the first province to be completely liberated in the South during the period of resistance against the US to save the country.
Having lost an outpost in the Southeast, the Saigon government issued a loud statement hoping for a strong response from the United States. President Nguyen Van Thieu ordered three days of national mourning for the loss of Phuoc Long. However, after a token response, the White House declared that the war in Vietnam was off the US agenda.
The Phuoc Long victory took place when the Politburo was meeting to discuss the plan to liberate the South. The Phuoc Long event was meant as a strategic reconnaissance, to probe the reaction of the United States if the revolutionary forces of the South overthrew the Saigon regime. This was a scientific basis for the Central Committee to outline the plan to liberate the South at that time.
Thus, after 2 years of exploration, with the 3 key events above, the problem of the opportunity to liberate the South has been experienced. The Party Central Committee has come to a scientific conclusion that the United States is unlikely to intervene again in the South if the people of the South move forward to overthrow the Nguyen Van Thieu regime and unify the country.
3. The position and strength of the two sides on the battlefield
In 1973-1974, the Northern rear sent hundreds of thousands of troops to the Southern battlefields. In the history of the anti-American, national salvation struggle, never before had the Southern revolutionary forces received such a large number of reinforcements in such a short period of time. Although the Saigon army still had about 1 million soldiers, the arrival of about 290,000 reinforcements from the North changed the relationship between us and the enemy on the battlefield.
Along with the strengthening of the army, the main army corps were established. On October 24, 1973, the 1st Army Corps (also known as the Victory Army Corps) was established in Tam Diep. On May 17, 1974, the 2nd Army Corps (also known as the Huong Giang Army Corps) was established. On July 20, 1974, the 4th Army Corps (the Cuu Long Army Corps) was established. Other army corps (Tay Nguyen and 232) were established later.
The establishment of the army corps represented the development of the revolutionary army in all aspects. Each army corps was equivalent to 3-4 divisions. But it was not a mere addition of the breakthrough power of the main divisions of the Vietnam People's Army. This was a qualitative change in the main force. The army corps were truly an iron fist capable of crushing the enemy's main force as it would show later. Also during these years, the main force regiments of the Region were merged together into strong divisions.
Along with the increase in troop numbers and the organization of a strong mobile main force, in 1973-1974, tens of thousands of civil and technical cadres from the North reinforced the Southern forces. Many civil-political-party cadres who had gone to the North in the past have now returned to their hometowns to carry out their duties.
From the beginning of 1973, the logistics system was reorganized. The Transport Department and the Truong Son Command (formerly 559) were strengthened with means and forces for transportation and warehouses. Nearly ten motor transport regiments operated regularly on the Ho Chi Minh trail. Warehouses and yards on strategic and campaign traffic routes were newly established and expanded. In the first 9 months of 1973 alone, the Northern rear area transferred 140,000 tons of goods to the battlefield, 4 times more than in 1972. By the end of 1974, the fronts in the South had tens of thousands of tons of weapons and materials. The Southern logistics area alone had reserved more than 100,000 tons of goods.[10].
The Ho Chi Minh Trail was expanded into a multi-lane strategic road system. Previously, the end point of the Ho Chi Minh Trail stopped at the Vietnam-Laos or Vietnam-Cambodia border, but by 1974 it had expanded deep into the interior of the South.[11]. Along with the strategic road system, tens of thousands of kilometers of campaign roads connecting the Ho Chi Minh trail with the fronts in the South were completed in 1973-1974. The strategic transportation system allowed units to march from the rear to the southern battlefield in just 20 days. During the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign, thousands of motor vehicles transported goods and troops to the South every day.
Along with the construction of the strategic and tactical road system, the petroleum system built in 1973-1974 connected the large rear areas to the battlefields. The 1,700 km long petroleum pipeline system was able to provide adequate and timely supply to the mechanized forces when operating in distant battlefields.
The logistics system and battlefield design in 1973-1974 created the premise for the 1975 spring uprising of our army and people in the South to take place at the rhythm of "one day equals 20 years".
At the same time, the liberation army actively counterattacked the encroachments of the Saigon army. The victories of the Liberation Army in Thuong Duc, Minh Long, Gia Vut... showed the weakening of the Saigon army's soldiers, including the strategic reserve units. A series of bases and footholds for the main divisions of the Saigon army were opened in 1974...
The comprehensive strengthening of human resources for the Southern revolution in the two years mentioned above, especially the revolutionary armed forces, has laid the foundation for the final and victorious battle in the coming time.
However, the Saigon army was still very large. The total number was about 1 million soldiers. If we consider the infantry force, it was in the top 5-6 in the world. The Saigon army's artillery firepower was large and well-equipped, modern and more numerous than the resistance force.
Most of the strategic positions in the South were still controlled by the Saigon army. By the end of 1974, no province in the South had been completely liberated. The liberated areas were still limited to some mountainous districts, remote areas. The population in the liberated areas was about 10% of the total population of the South.
With a strong strategic position on both ends (Quang Tri area in the North and the northern line of Saigon), the Saigon army was still very strong in terms of position and strength... The crucial weakness of the Saigon army was that when the US withdrew its troops from the South, its fighting spirit fell severely. The idea of defeat spread among all soldiers...
From the resonance of the above factors, by the end of 1974, the resistance war against the US to save the country of our people in the South, although still facing certain difficulties, had enough conditions to move forward to gain complete victory.
While the army and people of the whole country were urgently bringing the revolution to victory, a number of new objective factors appeared.
Having had this intention from the beginning, when the United States was withdrawing from the South and the Saigon government was confused, in January 1974, the Chinese army invaded the Hoang Sa archipelago under Vietnam's sovereignty.
Also stemming from external plots, after Vietnam proactively signed the Paris Agreement, the forcesKhmer Rougesought to sabotage our people's resistance war against the US to save the country. From mid-1974, when the Southern Liberation Forces attacked the Saigon army in positions close to the Cambodian border, the Khmer Rouge repeatedly attacked the rear bases, medical stations, and looted logistics facilities. Therefore, many army units were forced to leave behind a significant number of forces, including tanks, to block the Pol Pot army's rear attacks. The Pol Pot group's attack on Vietnam after May 1975 was just a continuation of actions that had been calculated in advance.
Meanwhile, in the urban area of Saigon, Cho Lon, some people are calledforeignerhas been planning to establish a number of Party cells with outside manipulation...
Obviously, all the above-mentioned seemingly separate events are part of a consistent plan to find a way to control and limit the Vietnamese people's national liberation struggle at its final decisive moment. Because the victory of the Vietnamese people, to some extent, is to prevent their great power's intention in their expansionist strategic intention.
The above events pose to the entire Party and people the need to end and resolve the South Vietnam issue as soon as possible, avoiding dark intentions that could deploy their expansionist nationalist strategy.
Taking into account all the above situations, in the conferences of the Supreme Command – including the conferences held from late 1974 to early 1975 at the General Headquarters, it was decided that the Southern revolution couldqualified and necessarymust move forward to liberate the South and unify the country.
The Supreme Command correctly predicted the possibility and determined to bring the Southern revolution to complete victory in a short time and chose the location and breakthrough front for that meticulous and scientific plan.
The resounding victory of Spring 1975 was the result and the pinnacle of the Vietnamese people's resistance war against the US to save the country. This historic victory was the crystallization of the long-term resistance war led by the Party, but directly speaking, it originated from the urgent, thoughtful, scientific preparation process and timely direction of the Supreme Command of the Vietnamese revolution. Among the reasons for the victory, there was an extremely important factor: the Supreme Command correctly grasped the root cause to promptly direct the army and people of the whole country to gain a resounding victory, completely liberating the South in the spring of 1975.
[1]Communist Party of Vietnam:Party Documents, Complete Works, Volume 34(1973). National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2004, p. 227.
[2]As above, p. 226.
[3]As above, p. 231.
[4]Communist Party of Vietnam:Party Documents, Complete Works, Volume 34(1973). National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2004, p. 243.
[5]As above, p. 237.
[6]In his resignation speech on April 21, 1975, Nguyen Van Thieu admitted that the Tong Le Chan affair was one of the first tests of the United States' ability to support the Saigon government.
[7]The content of the above Act stipulates that the President must notify Congress before sending troops abroad and must withdraw troops within half a year if Congress does not approve.
[8]Larry Berman:No peace, no honor,Viet Tide (USA) 2003, p. 329.
[9]Quoted from: Larry Berman, SDd, pp. 343,344.
[10]Ministry of National Defense - Vietnam Military History Institute:History of the resistance war against America to save the country (1954-1975), Volume VIII, Toan Thang. National Political Publishing House, H, 2008, p. 210.
[11]Le Mau Han (editor-in-chief):History of Vietnam, Volume IV, Vietnam Education Publishing House, H, 2013, p. 413.
Author:Nguyen Dinh Le (Hanoi National University)
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